Airline Security

I won't be trite and say "The T'r'rists have Won!", but I have to wonder if Osama isn't laughing his ass off in a cave somewhere. Is this really what we have been reduced to? In the days following 9/11, there were many reactions floating in the national mood, and one of the strongest I remember was: we will not submit, we will not be afraid. We've had a string of near misses with terrorists since, and the result is that we've reduced ourselves to plaintively bleating at the government: Help Us, Protect Us, Save Us - no matter the cost! A decade later, we have citizens paying their government in taxes and dignity to buy machines that take naked pictures of every person who buys a plane ticket or, for the more recalcitrant or suspect, government agents groping the public.

And what do we, the traveling public, get in return? Some assurance that another underwear bomber might be caught, or that the risk of being caught will force a terrorist to try a different attack. It's unlikely we'll have another suicide hijacking a la 9-11. That was, however, largely the result of hardening cockpits and an awareness among travelers that they may need to fight back. So terrorists move to planting ineffective explosives in shoes, so we start walking through security barefoot. They concoct a complicated plan to mix explosives in shampoo bottles, so we ban anything larger than 3 oz containers. They put explosives in their underwear, so we get virtual strip searches and enhanced pat-downs. Hoop upon hoop, layer upon layer, cat chasing mouse.

It is, however, just a matter of time before a way is found around this latest countermeasure. How long will it be until we have a terrorist attack (either successful, another dud, or thwarted early) with a bomb tucked in a terrorist's rectum? And what shall we do then? Full-body X-Rays for travelers? With cavity searches for those who refuse? Meanwhile, our ports, borders, and important public places are still ripe targets. Maybe an airline attack is too hard, so terrorists will switch tactics and truck-bomb a mall. What will we, as a society, then do?

As an engineer, I deal with risk assessment every day. Risk is not just "how bad can things go wrong?", it is also a matter of probability. The product of the two is risk. Low risks can be events with severe consequences, but with such low probability that the risk can be considered remote. And high risk is not always the end of the game. It may be that the risk is inherent to the system, and cannot be mitigated short of utterly extraordinary measures. In the jargon of risk management, you'd say the risk is "As Low As is Reasonably Practicable." At that point, it becomes a calculus to determine whether the potential benefits outweigh those residual risks. For medical devices, this calculus largely falls to the FDA, doctors, and patients. An artificial heart is an enormously risky device: it or the surgery will almost certainly kill you. On the other hand, if you are dying for a heart transplant that may be minutes or months away, it may not look so bad.

In terms of security, one can perform similar analyses. What are the potential threats, what are the possible outcomes of a security breach, what's the probability of that harm coming to pass, and what would it cost to mitigate that risk? There isn't a single answer to these questions: some people or institutions are more or less risk tolerant, some have more or less to lose, and some have more or fewer means to beef up security. At some point, however, everyone will have a limit where the additional costs cannot be borne, the residual risk is too small, and the additional costs outweigh the potential benefits. You draw a line, accept you can't or won't do more, and live with it.

So here's my take on the present subject or airline security. On the potential benefit side we have the reduced likelihood of a terrorist attack on an airplane and all the accompanying potential losses: loss of life, property damage, damage to the American psyche, and potential further cost as we roll out the latest countermeasure. That all seems like a very high toll - and it is. But it was a highly improbable event in the first place. So I count the risk as actually being pretty low, not only for myself as an individual, but also for my family and for the nation as a whole. On the cost side we have the direct costs for the scanners and personnel (a couple billion dollars at least), more lost time getting through security (billions and billions more), increased radiation exposure for travelers, increased road deaths as people throw up their hands and decide to drive, psychological damage at being either seen virtually nude or groped, and the enormous cost to the dignity and liberty of travelers. The potential for abuse or misconduct is high. And, lastly, it is not even clear, and certainly not demonstrable, that these new procedures are actually improving security, or that our resources would not be better spent, say, more thoroughly checking luggage or increasing human intelligence.

I tally this up and come to this conclusion: the costs of this latest security procedure are too high, and do not outweigh the potential (or hoped-for) benefits. For me, the line of diminishing returns was crossed some time ago. I can give some deference to the government being more conservative in their calculus: they have a duty to protect us, and their asses are on the line when something goes wrong. But even in that light, things have gone too far. Eventually, I think others will reach their own stopping point, but I fear what the traveling experience will be like by the time that happens.

Gasoline Insanity

It is true that the price of gas these days is a bit insane. Thankfully, due to our lifestyle, Hilary and I are somewhat insulated from it. We don't drive all that much; we have reasonably efficient vehicles. In that, we consider ourselves lucky. That is not to say that a $40 tankup doesn't go unnoticed - it hurts. I can't imagine the pain of the 100-mile/day commuter driving an SUV. It is small consolation that the price of gas in Europe is a fair bit higher - between $7 and $9 per gallon, or about twice our current pain.

But what's more insane than the price of gasoline? What people propose to do about it. Heard of Senator McCain's proposal to suspend the federal gas tax, which amounts to a whopping 18.4 cents per gallon? Or Senator Clinton's rejoinder? What about our dear President?

I have been mentally composing this blog post for a few days. I felt some of my thunder stolen when I read today's piece from Thomas Friedman, opinion columnist for the NY Times, largely on economic and environmental matters and how they impact the larger picture. I suppose I shouldn't feel too bad - it's tough to compete with the organization, resources, and bite of a professional columnist. Anyway, here's his take on this current insanity. Note the name of the piece is "Dumb as We Wanna Be."

But some fuel got added to the fire of this rant when I read a piece in the local paper by the Republican candidate for our congressional district. (He's so going to get his butt kicked, but I digress.) His solution to our current energy woes? Rely more on domestic sources of oil, such as off-shore and ANWR. In his view, there's still plenty of oil lying under American soil, and drilling it would start to address the problem of rising gas prices and a stalling economy.

Well hot diggity, we're off to Beverly Hills!

At the same time, however, he acknowledges that it'll take years (perhaps a decade by most accounts) for the first drops to begin flowing - hardly a fix for our current woes. He proclaims that there's enough crude in ANWR to supply the whole US demand for ten years. It depends greatly on whose numbers you believe - it could be as little as six months. Even if it is ten years, that's less than a generation. I would expect a candidate for Congress to advocate solutions with a slightly longer time horizon to what is, essentially, a permanent problem.

Whether it's ten years or ten months is kind of moot anyway - the Alaska pipeline only has so much capacity. Throughput peaked at about 2 million barrels a day back in the late 80s. Nowadays, as the North Slope oilfields decline, the current rate is about 1 million barrels a day. So, realistically only about one million additional barrels of crude a day could be transported out of ANWR. Considering that the US uses about 21 million barrels of oil a day, an extra one million equates to less than 5% of daily demand. That assumes that it's all used domestically, of course, which isn't necessarily the case. Global demand for oil is increasing, even if US demand is slowing. ANWR is the proverbial drop in the bucket in terms of global oil production and demand.

Don't expect that extra 5% of domestic production to lower rates at the pump by 5%, either. It isn't like that oil is free, or significantly cheaper than, say, oil from Canada or Saudi Arabia. Oil is a global commodity, no matter where it comes from. $120/barrel is the going rate whether you're in Valdez or Abu Dhabi. Sure, you save a bit on transportation costs - Prince William Sound is closer than the Persian Gulf, but transportation costs are pretty small compared to the price of the oil itself or the price of refining it into gasoline and diesel.

In short, domestic oil isn't going to bring the price of gas back down to a reasonable level.

Not today.
Not in ten years.
Not ever.

We will never be able to drill our way to energy independence. Really, the only place we can get by drilling is to dig ourselves in deeper.

The candidate's position is short sighted at best, and delusional at worst. But, hey, what can you expect from an addict. He, you, I, the whole country, are all addicted to oil. Heck, even the oilman President says so. To an addict, there can never be enough. Addicts, when it comes to their next fix, aren't rational about it, where it comes from, how they'll get it, or what it'll cost. One doesn't treat an addiction by looking for the next fix; that only makes the withdrawal that much the worse when the stash runs out. The only way to treat the addiction is to reduce the dependence on the substance. Cold Turkey can be a violent upheaval and doesn't always work in the long run. Weening can work better, and replacement helps to. What's the methadone or chantix for our addiction to oil? That is what the nation and world need to be doing right now. Instead of dickering over where we can get another million barrels a day, we should be seeking out where we can find a replacement for that million barrels.

That is what political leaders ought to be putting forth. We're in a tight spot, and we're gonna get roughed up pretty bad before things ease up (and they will, eventually the factors contributing to high gas prices will diminish - just don't expect to see it quickly or dramatically). Nothing any politician can do will ease the pain of the pump in an appreciable way anytime soon.

Want to impress me as a voter? Don't pander to me about saving two bucks per tank for a couple of months. Don't make me feel like David with talk about windfall taxes for the Goliath oil companies (removing the tax rebates they enjoy would be more appreciated). Tell me how you are going to change the economic game that got us into this fix. Tell me about increasing gas mileage standards (the ones that recently passed? Please! Europe and Japan are already there). Tell me about making gasoline less palatable so that people are encouraged to use less of it (did you know the federal gas tax hasn't changed in over a decade?). Tell me about investing billions into alternative energy and conservation technology. If we don't, someone else will, and then where will the trade deficit be?

Realistically, nothing anyone can do today is going to have an appreciable effect on the price at the pump. The more important question is: what does one do for tomorrow?

Knife

Well, Hilary and I are back from Vieques. Bummer. We were so enjoying lounging around in 80-degree, sunny weather. Now we're back in Minnesota, encountering teens and blowing snow. We are, however, extremely glad that we have this one last day off (Sunday) to regroup back at home before returning to school and work. We'll be posting more pictures from our trip as time goes on, but I'll post this one neat story from our return trip.

Most of you who read this blog know that I carry a knife with me regularly. Not just a small swiss army keychain knife with a nail file, but a 4" straight-edged lock blade made by Spyderco (the link is for the current model, mine's a few years old). I have carried one around since junior year in college, and find that its utility in my day to day life outweighs the odd remarks I sometimes get when I whip it out and flick it open it, one handed, in the space of about a second. I use it to open letters and packages, pull splinters, trim cuticles, strip wire, and as a fine probe. It has many other uses, including in emergencies.

Obviously, this isn't something that, even back in the day, would have been allowed through airport security. Therefore, it must be in my checked baggage, or I simply don't bring it on trips. I have actually had one disappear from my checked bag en route, but that's a different story entirely.

Anyway, suffice to say I had it with me on this trip - I peeled mangos with it, for instance, since the knives at La Finca left much to be desired. I won't get into all the details of our return itinerary, but in summary: us young'ens got back to San Juan airport in the middle of saturday morning, checked in with our respective airlines, and checked one bag apiece. Then we caught a cab to Old San Juan to kill a few hours before we went back to the airport to catch our mid-late afternoon flights.

The cab we returned in was in good repair, but my seatbelt was clearly having issues. When we pulled up to the drop off area, I found that I couldn't release the latch. Try as I might, it simply wouldn't let me go. The driver had no luck either. I could conceivably still extricate myself from the seatbelt by pulling some extra slack out and sliding underneath it. That is, I should have been able to pull some extra length out. However, the belt arrest mechanism, which prevents the belt from reeling out in an accident, engaged as I was playing around with the belt latch. Before I knew it, I didn't have enough slack in the belt to even continue play around with the latch. There are pictures of me in this predicament, which may or may not get posted in the future.

The cabbie was a good sport and, realizing that this was a serious problem, mentioned that he'd cut the belt if he had a knife. Well, as it so happened, I did have a knife and, after shimmying it out from my pocket under the seatbelt, whipped it open and sliced the belt. Freedom!

[As it happens, this means that my knife would be useful in case of a car accident - yet another good reason to carry it around]

By the time I got to the curb, however, I realized that the fact that I had my knife with which to free myself was a bit of a problem - we had already checked our bags hours ago! My knife had pulled me through in a real pinch, was I now going to have to relinquish it? Determined to keep it, I sought out the airport post office. You would think that, with the large number of items banned from airplanes, every airport would have a post office facility (or, at least, a self-serve kiosk) RIGHT NEXT to security, available for 24-hour, last minute shipping. However, this isn't the case. The San Juan airport has a post office but, alas, it is closed on Saturday and Sunday. What the Hell?

The airport does, however, have a Best Western Hotel and Casino. I was able to beg a hotel stationary envelope from the desk clerk and a few sheets of paper. Visits to three different souvenir shops yielded a place that sold postage stamps (at a 10% markup - is that even legal?). Next question: how much postage? It was a typical envelope, into which I was putting my several-ounce knife folded into a few sheets of paper (to keep the envelope from breaking). What's the postage for a several-ounce envelope? Is the postage from Puerto Rico the same as it is for the rest of the U.S.? I suppose I could have used my iPhone to look up the knife's weight online (from the mfg website), then the postage (from the USPS). But, I was in a hurry, so I just rounded it way up and put six stamps on it. Then, crossing my fingers, I slid it across the check-in counter at the casino/hotel and went back to find the rest of my group.

As it turns out, when I checked the USPS postage calculator this afternoon, I found that I was probably conservative by a factor of 2. That's fine - the extra postage is nothing compared to the replacement cost. We'll see if it makes it through.

Ashcroft on Wiretapping

Now, most readers of this blog are probably of a like mind to H and myself when it comes to the government's warrantless wiretapping program (past, present, and future). It is extremely sketchy at best, and downright unconstitutional in the main. One aspect of the whole case that is now making its way back into the headlines is the culpability of the telecom giants that assisted the government in this program. The latest FISA reform bill would have given those companies retroactive immunity for their participation. That bill has been held up by Chris Dodd, and so has settled to the background again for a while.

However, chiming in on the debate was former attorney general John Ashcroft. In an op-ed piece in the NY Times the other day, he lays out arguments for why this immunity should be granted.

On the other hand are a number of responses to the NY Times, including one from Russ Feingold. It all makes for interesting reading that a well-informed citizen should catch up on.

A good read

My current reading is a book by Bruce Schneier, who started off in computer and network security, but is now regarded as one of the best authorities on security in general. His latest book, for a popular audience, is Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensible About Security in an Uncertain World. The subtitle pretty much sums it up. This book was published in 2006, so it has five years' hindsight about the 9/11 attacks and the change in perceptions about security since then. He has quite a few things to say on the matter, both on the attacks themselves, the state of anti-terrorism security before then, and some of changes to airline security that have occurred since then. He largely eschews the political questions involved - security measures aren't Right or Left, but rather Good or Worthless. Mostly, he uses aspects of 9/11 and airline security measures as illustrations to instill the reader with a broader understanding of what security really is: how it works, what it can and can't do, what constitutes good security, and so on. In his approach, security isn't only walls, locks, and guys with guns protecting us against hijackings, bank robbery, and computer hacks. Above all, in every situation that requires security, he provides a framework for systematic analysis that forces a close examination of the real risks, the possible mitigations, and the trade-offs. He reiterates that all security systems can break, perfect security is a fantasy, and all security has costs, not all of which are monetary.

With all the fear mongering about terr'rists, and the various security measures (good and bad, effective and brittle) that have been pushed through using that fear as justification, it is, to me, a wonderful breath of fresh air to see someone dispassionately and intelligently examine what security is all about and how to evaluate it. I recommend it highly.

Book review (and esuing discussion) at Slashdot.